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I. INTRODUCTION
The crisis of communications on 9/11 and in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina underscores that emergency responders are largely ill-
equipped to communicate effectively in times of disaster as well as in day-
* Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado. Thanks to
Brad Bernthal, James Crowe, Dale Hatfield, Jennifer Manner, Tricia Paoletta, Jill Van
Matre, and Charles Werner for helpful comments and encouragement.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
to-day emergency situations that require the coordination of several
different public safety agencies. The reason for this state of affairs is that
public safety agencies traditionally have made individualized decisions
about information and communications technology,' generally failing to
purchase state-of-the-art technology that operates effectively and
interoperates with others involved in emergency response. Thus, even in
today's Internet-connected world, public safety agencies continue to rely
on single-purpose technologies that do not provide economies of scale,
network flexibility, or the broader functionalities routinely used by the
military and private sector enterprises.
Unfortunately, the failings among public safety communications
systems on 9/11 and in the wake of Hurricane Katrina were entirely
predictable and avoidable. After all, "[d]espite numerous after-action
reports, public safety services have yet to make significant progress in
comprehensively addressing interoperability. 2 Part of this failing can be
explained by the traditional reluctance of public safety communications
managers to invest in new technologies; in many cases, such managers
claim that only traditional land mobile radio ("LMR") services designed
specifically for their use can meet their needs.3 Thus, until public safety
agencies are willing to embrace technologies other than their traditional
LMRs, they will continue to possess limited communications capabilities
and perpetuate the failings of our current system.
To change the culture and realities of public safety communications,
policymakers must develop a new architecture for the use of information
and communications technologies (i.e., one that leverages the power of
Internet technology) and provide a framework for leadership (subject to
benchmarking) to transition to a next generation system for public safety
communications. Such a culture change would include not only an embrace
of new technologies, but a new framework for technology leadership-at
1. This Article uses the term "public safety" to capture a broad range of entities
involved in emergency response. In particular, it emphasizes that opportunities to use
information and communications technology effectively are not limited to traditional "first
responders" (such as fire and police), but also extends to all of those likely to respond to
emergency situations (ranging from agencies concerned with transportation infrastructure to
public health providers to the 9-1-1 system to electric utilities). Moreover, this Article also
takes a broad view of information and communications technology-including not simply
wired and wireless local telecommunications networks, but also the information technology
associated with accessing and sharing critical information. Nonetheless, it sometimes uses
as shorthand the term "public safety communications."
2. See William L. Pessemier, Top Priority: A Fire Service Guide to Interoperable
Communications 2, International Association of Fire Chiefs (2006), http://www.interoperabi
lity.publicsafety.virginia.gov/pdfs/FireService-InteropHandbook.pdf.
3. Larry Irving, Land Mobile Spectrum Planning Options, app. at 1, Oct. 19, 1995,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/slyerpt/appendix.html.
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the state or regional level-that spurs decision making in a coordinated
fashion (and not through ad hoc decisions by over 50,000 different local
agencies). In short, this Article explains which new technologies can
transform public safety communications and which intergovernmental
relations strategy will be necessary to facilitate the implementation of such
technologies.
This Article proceeds in five parts. After this Introduction in Part I,
Part II outlines the current state of public safety communications. Part III
discusses five technological developments-multimode radio systems;
Internet Protocol-based architectures; cognitive radio technology;
broadband wireless systems; and distributed information management-
that can, taken together, dramatically improve the state of public safety
communications. Part IV discusses the optimal intergovernmental strategy
for developing and implementing such new technologies. Part V offers a
short conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
The state of information and communications management among
today's emergency responders reflects a technological architecture that, in
most cases, was designed and implemented based on (at best) 1980s
technology. Consequently, for most emergency responders (ranging from
police departments to fire departments to public health officials), their
limited use of advanced information and communications technology
largely reflects the fact that each agency has traditionally purchased
special-purpose equipment designed for their particular needs. These needs,
as traditionally understood, constituted merely the ability to talk to one
another, with limited interest in interoperability, broadband connectivity, or
adaptability to new technology.4
The traditional public safety mindset about information and
communications technology focuses on the value of a radio link that
provides each agency with a single channel for analog voice
communications with their staff in the field. Consequently, as late as 1995,
"most public safety radio systems remain[ed] based on 50-year old
spectrum technology-i.e., single-channel, 15 kHz bandwidth analog FM
radio--which has been superseded in many services by more efficient
technology." 5 Over the last ten years, and particularly over the last five
years (i.e., since 9/11), there is an increased awareness about the limits of
4. See Jon M. Peha, From TV to Public Safety: The Needfor Fundamental Reform in
Public Safety Spectrum and Communications Policy 3 (New America Foundation Working
Paper No. 15, 2006), available at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/fromtv_
to_public safety (setting out basic assumptions of public safety agencies).
5. Irving, supra note 3, at app. 1.
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such a system both in terms of its capabilities and its lack of
interoperability with other systems. To address these limits, an oft-
prescribed cure is to develop "centralized trunked radio systems" that pool
spectrum licensed to particular agencies and authorize two-way radio
communications on an "as needed" basis, 6 thereby providing greater
spectrum efficiency and interoperability between the different participating
agencies.7 Notably, such systems are far more efficient than their
traditional counterparts because "[fjar fewer channels are needed to serve
multiple agencies if those channels are shared by all agencies, or
equivalently, the same number of channels can support far more mobile
users when channels are shared among agencies. ' 8
To date, a number of jurisdictions have improved spectrum efficiency
and interoperability by instituting systems of shared "digital trunked
systems." Notably; the Alaska Land Mobile Radio ("ALMR") system
provides an impressive example of how such a system can greatly improve
public safety communications; in particular, the ALMR enables federal,
state, and local governments to share frequencies. 9 In this arrangement,
which is the first statewide sharing agreement of its kind, federal and state
agencies pool their spectrum with the high-band VHF channels used for
communications from mobile units and the state spectrum used for fixed
infrastructure transmissions.10 By so doing, the ALMR system operates
6. Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger, The Politics of Public Safety Interoperability
Regulation, 29 TELECOMMS. POL'Y 831, 833 (2005) (suggesting a path to interoperability
based on the "willingness of public safety agencies to replace their existing analog
equipment with new digital-trunked infrastructure using a common standard and
frequency.").
7. As Dale Hatfield has explained:
Trunking systems are premised on the insight that pooling a group of channels
together and giving the users access to all channels on an "as needed" basis
provides better service by reducing the likelihood of a channel-busy condition.
Trunking may be accomplished in a centralized or decentralized manner. In a
centralized trunking system, information on the status of the pooled channels, e.g.,
in-use or idle, is stored in a computer like device or controller typically located at
the base station transmitter or repeater site. A dedicated control channel is then
used to exchange signaling information between the controller at the central site
and the mobile units. In this architecture, the mobile units continuously monitor
the control channel when they are in the idle state.
Dale N. Hatfield, Lessons From Trunked Radio Systems (2006) (working paper on file with
the author).
8. Id. See also Jon M. Peha, Protecting Public Safety With Better Communications
Systems, IEEE COMM. MAG., Mar. 2005, at 9, available at http://www.comsoc.org/cil/Publi
c/2005/Mar/cireg.html (citations omitted) (noting opportunities for greater spectral
efficiency).
9. App'ns of State of Alaska Request for Waiver, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
para. 1, DA 03-2612 (Aug. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Alaska Request].
10. Donny Jackson, Trailblazers, MRT MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2006, available at http://mrt
mag.com/mag/radio-trailblazers/index.html.
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more efficiently than conventional systems, allowing all of the relevant
agencies "to use fewer channels to provide the same communications
capability."'1 Moreover, the ALMR system has received "rave reviews"
following a 2005 exercise where federal a encies (such as FEMA) worked
in partnership with their local counterparts.
To understand the traditional public safety mindset, one must
appreciate that, in many cases, police officers value their radios more than
their guns. Local LMR systems thus constitute a vital tool that police
departments, for example, will often insist on controlling and operating
themselves. Viewed from this perspective, it is understandable how even a
single channel system dedicated to the police department may seem
preferable to a multichannel, trunked system that is shared between
different agencies and not controlled by the police department. In principle,
trunked systems shared between different agencies should operate as or
more effectively than traditional systems, but some departments have yet to
adopt such systems, either based on a lack of funding, ineffective
coordination, or a fear of the unknown. Whatever the reason for the
challenges in promoting trunked radio systems that facilitate
interoperability, it is important to appreciate-as Part III emphasizes-that
such systems only solve interoperability issues to a limited degree (i.e.,
they generally leave some relevant agencies unconnected to the particular
system 13) and fail to address the larger and more systematic weaknesses of
public safety communications systems.
As a result of the traditional resistance to new technologies, public
safety agencies generally have used (even in the trunked system model)
specialized blocks of spectrum that are paired with single-purpose radio
infrastructure. In practice, this means that public safety agencies are limited
to narrowband channels and do not benefit from the economies of scale
garnered by commercial, off-the-shelf systems. To justify this practice,
public safety agencies insist that only this model of communications can
meet their needs. Relatedly, they often reject the suggestion that
commercial providers could meet any of their communications needs,
highlighting that their requirements are more demanding and could not be
met by commercial providers.
11. Alaska Request, supra note 9, at para. 18 (citation omitted).
12. Jackson, supra note 10.
13. "The U.S. Conference of Mayors reports that 23 percent of the nation's 60,000
police and fire departments cannot communicate with each other over the radio, one-third
cannot talk to county sheriffs, and most cannot talk to state or federal agencies." Spencer S.
Hsu, FEMA Overhaul Debate Stalls Funds For Interoperable Radios, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2006, at A12.
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Almost all observers agree that trunked radio systems improve upon
the traditional model of public safety communications and that the relevant
technology is well established (and has been for nearly twenty years).14
Compared to the opportunities to improve public safety communications
based on emerging technologies, the relative benefits of this upgrade are
relatively minor. Consequently, unless the culture around public safety
communications changes, the improvements related to the Internet Protocol
revolution will not be adopted by public safety agencies, and they will
continue to exist in their own state of technological isolation. Or, to use
Thomas Hazlett's more colorful language, "[e]mergency radio services
need to exit their government technology ghetto and get onboard advanced
networks-as smart customers, not Soviet-style suppliers." 
15
As they currently exist, public safety communications systems are a
case study of how not to develop an IT enterprise. First, the current
model-centered on expensive single-purpose radio systems-ensures that
most agencies adopt an architecture that does not allow for evolution and
dynamism. Second, despite the aspirations of the Project 25 effort, 16 the
model of "public safety exceptionalism" has left agencies isolated and with
a limited number of vendors prepared to meet their needs by selling them
expensive equipment. Finally, in a move that ignores the recent
technological trends, public safety agencies generally depend on radios
where the intelligence is hardwired in physical devices-as opposed to in a
logical layer (e.g., consisting of Internet Protocol-related standards) that is
easily configurable and extensible-that are only engineered for voice
communications (and not data or video).
When policymakers talk about the public safety interoperability
problem, they are generally reacting to the symptoms of a larger problem
while failing to address the broader, systemic challenges. Going forward,
policymakers should not continue to fund and encourage public safety
agencies to adopt advanced shared systems built on a technologically
14. Indeed, this may well be what Secretary Chertoff had in mind when he stated that
the shortcomings in the state of emergency responders' communications are "not a
technological challenge," but rather a management one. Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the
Tactical Interoperable Communications Conference (May 8, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0281.shtm. I certainly concur with this
judgment, although, as discussed below, I think the better technological course is to pave the
way for tomorrow's technology (as opposed to investing in yesterday's technology).
15. Thomas W. Hazlett, Katrina 's Radio Silence, FT.coM, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.ft
.com/cms/s/8defb2f6-4486-1 lda-a5fO-00000e251 1c8.html.
16. The "Project 25" initiative, spearheaded by the Association of Public Safety
Communications Officials ("APCO") and supported by the Telecommunications Industry
Association ("TIA"), has sought to craft a set of open standards that would invite entry and
facilitate interoperability into the world of public safety communications. What Is Project
25?, PTIG, http://www.project25.org/modules.php?name=Content&file=viewarticle&id=2.
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antiquated model. 17 Rather, they should embrace a broader architecture that
can include a role for traditional LMRs as well as embrace a role for
commercially available off-the-shelf equipment and technologies that can
be readily adapted to meet the requirements of public safety. In so doing,
policymakers should end the tradition of allowing public safety agencies to
remain on a technologically isolated platform in the midst of ever-more
powerful and innovative networks and equipment. In some cases, this
tradition will be hard to break given that a number of current projects
revolve solely around a shared trunking system specialized for particular
public safety agencies and, as is always the case, it is difficult to abandon
projects that have been in the development process for quite some time. 18
To continue ahead with such projects, however, would only exacerbate the
current failings and defer the move to a more flexible and technologically
advanced platform.
III. TOWARD A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCIES
Building on Part II's critique of the state of public safety
communications, this Part develops the broad architecture and explains the
specific technologies that promise-if given an opportunity-to transform
public safety communications. In short, this Part focuses on five related
technologies that mutually reinforce one another: (1) a modular
architecture; (2) a reliance on Internet Protocol technology; (3) the use of
cognitive radio technology; (4) the development of broadband access
technology; and (5) the use of rights management to shared information
resources. Taken together, these technologies promise to enable public
safety agencies to operate in a more technologically dynamic climate and to
achieve far greater levels of operability and interoperability than possible
with a strategy centered on centralized trunked systems.'
9
17. Some have suggested that the failure of the Project 25 endeavor to facilitate more
competition reflects the influence of Motorola in pushing for incompatible standards. One
commentator, for example, suggested that Motorola:
[L]obbied the FCC to adapt the standard it had helped design. The standard
provided backward compatibility with both old analog and non-trunked systems.
This standard was also incompatible with a standard developed at about the same
time by the Europeans ... . This in effect limited access to the U.S. market. Not
surprisingly by 2000, only one major equipment manufacturer-Motorola-
offered infrastructure compatible with the standard Motorola had successfully
lobbied for.
Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 6, at 835, n. 15.
18. As Jon Peha explains, this description may well apply to the federal government's
own Integrated Wireless Network Initiative. See Peha, supra note 4, at 8.
19. For an argument along these lines (and similar to the thrust of this Article), see
Tamara Casey et al., Architecting a Next Generation Network for Public Safety (2006),
http://www.cyrencall.com/downloads/CyrenCallTechnicalExhibit.pdf.
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A. The Importance of a Modular Architecture
The first principle of a next generation strategy is to embrace a
modular, flexible, and extensible architecture that can incorporate new
networks and equipment. Such an architecture is increasingly used in the
commercial cellular environment where firms integrate traditional cellular
networks alongside other networks (say, Wi-Fi) and enable switching
between the two on either a selected or automatic basis. In many cases, this
modularity is stitched together by multimode phones, but it can also simply
be achieved by enabling both functions to operate at the same time. To
appreciate how such an architecture would operate, consider Figure 1
below, which depicts the use of a satellite overlay network and a related
terrestrial cellular network ("ATC") as well as a legacy LMR network.
Dispatch console
Figure 1
(note: diagram is conceptual in nature and not drawn to scale)
As suggested by Figure 1, the optimal technological architecture is
one that recognizes a role for different devices and networks (including
legacy LMRs and emerging wireless broadband systems), allowing them to
be integrated by users in a sensible manner.2 1  But even a suboptimal
20. Figure 1 and the explanation of how such an architecture would operate and fit the
needs of public safety come from Philip J. Weiser et al., Toward a Next Generation
Architecture For Public Safety Communications 10-11 (2006), available at http://papers.ssr
n.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstract-id=90315 l#PaperDownload.
21. For most major enterprises, this type of tailoring is quite common and is often
performed by firms referred to as "system integrators."
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version of this architecture, where public safety personnel carry multiple
devices in the field, improves upon the current state of public safety
communications. In fact, as Jon Peha has recognized:
Unofficially, many police and firefighters routinely carry cellular
phones as backup when the official system proves inadequate. They do
this at their own expense. Thus, public safety does use commercial
services from time to time, but often without careful and systematic
thought about how to do it well. It is clear that the chances of
communicating during an emergency would be improved if first
responders could use any system that is still operating after an
emergency, regardless of whether this is a public safety syst5n, a
commercial system, a municipal Wi-Fi network, or anything else.
Fortunately, this recognition is attracting increasing support, with the FCC
recently underscoring that "there may now be a place for commercial
providers to assist public safety in securing and protecting the homeland.
' 23
The modular architecture outlined above would greatly improve
performance, operability, interoperability, and redundancy without
compromising on the ability to use LMRs for mission-critical (i.e.,
shoot/don't shoot) situations. Again, as Jon Peha has observed, "while
public safety has demanding needs for mission-critical real-time
applications, much of public safety communications is not mission-critical,
so failure is tolerable, or first responders can simply try again later."24 For
such situations, like many of the communications needs in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, a modular communications environment that included a
satellite overlay (such as that facilitated by an ATC system) would be
likely to operate effectively when other terrestrial-based options were
inoperable. Recognizing this point, FCC Chairman Martin explained that
"[i]f we learned anything from Hurricane Katrina, it is that we cannot rely
solely on terrestrial communications.'2
5
B. The Opportunities From an Integrated Communications
Architecture Built Around Internet Protocol Technology
In all sectors other than public safety, the powerful trend in
information technology as well as in communications policy has moved
22. Peha, supra note 4, at 6.
23. Report to Congress On the Study to Assess Short-Term and Long-Term Needs for
Allocations of Additional Portions of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 37 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 706, 707 (2005). See also Peha, supra note 8 (stating that "the United States should
reevaluate the traditional separation between public safety systems and commercial
systems.").
24. Peha, supra note 4, at 6.
25. Hearing on Communications in a Disaster Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman,
FCC) [hereinafter Statement of Kevin J. Martin].
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away from a silo-based mentality. Increasingly, information technology
and communications equipment capitalizes on the rapid improvements in
processing power, advances in storage technology, and the innovations
unleashed by the wide adoption of Internet Protocol-based networking.
This powerful trend is captured under many rubrics (such as the "digital
broadband migration" or "next generation network" concepts), but it
essentially envisions that data broadband networks will carry Internet
Protocol-based packets that will liberate particular services from traditional
networks. In such an environment, numerous different networks are
accessible by a range of devices, and all can interact with shared services.
For public safety agencies, Internet technology is often viewed as
irrelevant to their mission. After all, the argument goes, the Internet is a
general purpose platform and could not begin to meet their needs. This
argument, however, ignores two critical points. First, Internet technology
(i.e., the use of the TCP/IP protocol suite) is not the same as the Internet
itself. Second, with respect to both Internet technology and the Internet
itself, many sectors of the economy (including the military) take advantage
of "the near-ubiquity of the Internet and the wide availability of advanced
wireless" services, suggesting that public safety agencies could use such
technologies effectively as well.26 To be sure, any such development will
require an abandonment of the "public safety exceptionalism" mentality
and the recognition that Internet technology (and not necessarily the
Internet per se) can afford enormous flexibility and provide an effective
platform for applications that can be tailored to meet the specific needs of
public safety.
The commitment to a flexible, Internet-based architecture that
includes commercial systems would enable public safety agencies to
capitalize on innovations that are creating new opportunities for all users of
information and communications technology ("ICT"). In an effort to
advance this vision, the FCC's National Reliability and Interoperability
Council's ("NRIC") Focus Group ID called for an emergency
communications system linked in an "inter-network" fashion. In particular,
it recommended "a set of policies, tools, interfaces and standards that
connect securely the multiplicity of local, regional and national wireline
and wireless networks."
27
A public safety ICT vision that incorporated Internet Protocol ("IP")-
based networks offers the potential to transform public safety
communications systems from islands of proprietary technology to a sea of
26. LINDA K. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS:
POLICY, PROPOSALS, LEGISLATION AND PROGRESS 17 (2005).
27. Focus GROUP ID, NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VII,
COMMUN. ISSUES FOR EMERGENCY COMMuN. BEYOND E911 3 (2005).
[Vol. 59
Number 3] COMMUNICATING DURING EMERGENCIES
compatible and more efficient infrastructure. In particular, such a vision
would move public safety agencies--say, on a state-wide basis-to an
enterprise architecture that could be designed and implemented in a
manner that enables all parts of the enterprise to communicate effectively
with other parts and to share information as needed. Significantly, the
notion of an enterprise system, which is facilitated by IP-based technology,
reflects a more robust concept of interoperability than the effort to patch
together legacy radios through a shared trunked system.
The importance of embracing an enterprise architecture built around
IP technology is that it can incorporate and include different entities which
operate networks that need to interact with public safety agencies to
address a particular set of circumstances. To attempt to engineer
specialized networks with the aim of connecting particular agencies-say,
fire, police, and sheriffs-is doomed to leave out relevant agencies.
Consider, for example, that public health agencies, electric companies, and
forest services are also likely to be involved in mission-critical responses in
particular emergency situations.
Stated simply, if the relevant ICT system is engineered as a closed
universe, it will be difficult-if not impossible-to share important
information with agencies not connected via the specialized network. By
contrast, an IP-based network can easily authorize and include other
agencies on a limited and as needed basis. Moreover, an IP network
provides valuable flexibility that can easily allow for end-to-end encryption
whereby users of the network would not be able to receive and process
encrypted communications unless authorized to do so.
Given the possibilities of an enterprise architecture, it makes sense to
embrace a broad version of interoperability that can link together all
affected agencies and enable them to communicate not merely via voice
communications, but to exchange data and video communications as well.
A recent Senate bill (S. 2845) articulated just such a conception, calling for
a definition of "interoperable communications" as:
the ability of emergency response providers and relevant Federal,
State, and local government agencies to communicate with each other
as necessary... utilizing information technology systems and radio
communications systems, and to exchan voice, data, or video with
one another.., in real time, as necessary.
Significantly, this definition mirrors the NRIC model, which specifically
calls for the use of IP technology to accomplish this objective.29
28. H.R. REP. No. 108-796, at 213 (2004).
29. This solution mirrors the one called for by NRIC VII Focus Group 1D, which
suggested that:
[a] single, interconnected Internet Protocol system should be used for all
emergency communications, connecting a wide variety of agency-run and public
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
Even without a clear federal commitment to a public safety
architecture built around IP technology, commercial firms are developing
solutions to interoperability based on IP. Notably, Cisco, Twisted Pair, and
others have developed a proposal for connecting existing radio systems into
an IP gateway. Cisco's system, for example, uses one channel to connect to
the gateway, allowing for interoperability through a gateway that allowed
other channels (presuming that there is more than one channel) to be used
for ordinary radio communications.30 In the case of Twisted Pair Solutions,
it has pioneered what it calls a "WAVE management system," which uses a
server to enable public safety communications to operate more effectively.
Using the WAVE system, public safety agencies can-based on the open
IP standard-utilize more advanced dispatch systems, host multiple
different types of user groups (which can be configured on an as needed
basis), and adopt new innovations that can ride on this platform.3 1 To date,
a number of public safety agencies (such as the Coast Guard) have
implemented this approach, both improving the functionality of their
systems and saving money by enabling their legacy systems (including
personal computers) to broaden their ability to communicate. 3
C. Cognitive Radio Technology
In many respects, cognitive radio (or "smart radio") technology builds
perfectly upon-and enables the virtues of-lIP networking and a modular
architecture. Unlike traditional radio technology, cognitive radio
networks, both wireline and wireless. Focus Group ID calls this an
"Internetwork" to emphasize that this group does not believe a new physical
network is needed. It is a system of systems approach.
Focus GROUP ID, supra note 27, at 7.
30. See Cisco Systems, Solutions for Communications Interoperability 2-3 (2005),
http://www.cisco.com/application/pd/en/us/guest/products/ps6718/cl 244/cdccont_0900aec
d80350fee.pdf.
31. See TWISTED PAIR SOLUTIONS, How WAVE WORKS 3-4 (2006),
http://www.twistpair.com/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=Product%200verview/wave-
howworks-po-8.5xl 1.pdf. As their marketing material explains:
WAVE is a software application suite that manages secure, real-time group
communications over the IP network, enabling interoperable communications
between any connected devices. Importantly, WAVE is an interoperability
solution that works with your current radio system, connects with any radio
equipment from any manufacturer at any frequency, and always remains under
your control.
TWISTED PAIR SOLUTIONS, WAVE FOR INTEROPERABILITY 1 (2007), http://www.twistpair
.com/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=Solution%20Briefwave-interop-sb-8.5x 1 .pdf.
32. See TWISTED PAIR SOLUTIONS, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD: THE USCG SAVES
LIVES WITH INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS SOLUrIONS POWERED BY WAVE (2006),
http://www.twistpair.com/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=Case%20Study/wave-
coastguard-cs-a4.pdf.
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technology relies on intelligence at the edges of the network,33 whereby
radios are "aware" of their environment and can adapt accordingly. 34 In
many cases, the cognitive capabilities are driven by software-thus, the
concept of a "software defined radio"35 ("SDR")-meaning that the
physical layer is programmable and reconfigurable. In an SDR (as opposed
to a traditional radio's fixed hardware), capabilities traditionally controlled
by hardware-including signal processing, modulation/demodulation, and
power control-are accomplished by reconfigurable software. Ideally, this
flexibility and dependability on software renders such radios "future proof'
(i.e., immune to becoming technologically antiquated).
An important feature of cognitive radios is that they are able to
change how and where they operate. By enabling the same radio to use
different modulation schemes, waveforms, and frequencies, they are able
to, as the FCC explained, "identify and use spectrum that otherwise would
,,36
not be available for fear of causing interference. For this reason,
Chairman Martin has championed their use by public safety agencies,
explaining that they would enable agencies to use "multiple frequencies in
multiple formats" and benefit from a more "flexible infrastructure."3 7 This
flexible infrastructure would be less expensive insofar as base stations
33. The NTIA defined cognitive radio systems as "[a] radio or system that senses its
operational electromagnetic environment and can dynamically and autonomously adjust its
radio operating parameters to modify system operation, such as maximize throughput,
mitigate interference, facilitate interoperability, [and] access secondary markets." In the
Matter of Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum,
Comments of Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. 44, ET Docket No. 03-108 (Feb. 15, 2005).
34. For a survey of the developments in this area, see Ian F. Akyildiz et al., NeXt
Generation/Dynamic Spectrum Access/Cognitive Radio Wireless Networks: A Survey, 50
COMPUTER NETWORKS 2127 (2006).
35. As defined in 47 C.F.R. § 2.1, a SDR is a:
radio that includes a transmitter in which the operating parameters of frequency
range, modulation type or maximum output power (either radiated or conducted),
or the circumstances under which the transmitter operates in accordance with
Commission rules, can be altered by making a change in software without making
any changes to hardware components that affect the radio frequency emissions.
47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2005). See also Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and
Reliable Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive Radio Techs., Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R.
5486, para. 9 (2005) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 2.1) [hereinafter CR Report and Order].
36. Id. atpara. 11.
37. Statement of Kevin J. Martin, supra note 25, at 7. Chairman Martin's observation
echoed the findings of an earlier GAO Report. That report explained that "[s]oftware-
defined radios will allow interoperability among agencies using different frequency bands,
different operational modes (digital or analog), proprietary systems from different
manufacturers, or different modulations (such as AM or FM)." U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: PROTECTING STRUCTURES AND
IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS DURING WILDLAND FIRES 61-62 (2005). See also Jonathan
Adelstein, Commissioner, FCC, Remarks at the Global Regulatory Summit on SDR and
Cognitive Radio (June 20, 2005), available at http://www.npstc.org/documents/Adelstein%
20Keynote.pdf (praising the benefits of SDR).
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could support multiple technologies, and radios could be aware of their
environment, locating unused spectrum and utilizing it on an as needed
basis.
In a flexible environment, there would be an opportunity to automate
spectrum coordination between adjacent public safety agencies, enabling
the sharing of spectrum as well as the reconfiguration of radios over time.
Significantly, "smart radio" technology promises to "enable operability
among public safety agencies on multiple air interfaces, overlaying existing
systems without disruption, upgrading legacy systems, including possible
transition from one radio interface to another, and the easy selection of
[radio frequency] band, air interface, and group affiliation by users of
portable [smart radio] equipment."3 8 This ability to adapt to different
environments can be particularly significant in the public safety context
where radios for certain agencies might need to operate on different
frequencies in their home territory and in adjacent ones. Moreover, the
sharing opportunities for public safety radio users are likely to be
significant, as the legacy system of spectrum management for public safety
(as discussed above) leaves different agencies with particular spectrum
assignments that often lay fallow.
To appreciate how "smart radio" technology enables a more flexible
and efficient use of spectrum assigned to public safety agencies, it is worth
emphasizing how this technology resembles (and improves upon) the use
of trunking technology. As discussed above, trunking arrangements can be
an effective coordination tool, but smart radio technology takes this basic
framework and implements it in a more effective manner. Notably, smart
radio technology can be viewed as "trunking writ large," as it uses the same
basic insight as trunking (i.e., the sharing of capacity on a dynamic basis)
to achieve efficient use of the spectrum. Consequently, smart radio
technology operates in the same manner as decentralized trunking,39 albeit
using a different technological architecture.
The ability of smart radio technology to improve public safety
communications dramatically is one that the federal government should
seek to promote aggressively. To date, there are some important research
38. Id.
39. Dale Hatfield explained the difference between centralized and decentralized
trunking as:
Decentralized trunking systems do not store information on the status of the
pooled channels on a centralized basis and no dedicated control channel is
involved. Instead, in a decentralized system the mobile and dispatcher radio units
can be said to continuously scan or monitor all of the pooled channels in the
system. When a dispatch call is initiated by a mobile unit or dispatcher, the unit
immediately stops at the next idle channel in the pool.
Hatfield, supra note 7.
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initiatives, such as the National Institute of Justice grant to build a
"Prototype Public Safety Cognitive Radio for Universal Interoperability.
' 4 °
As noted above, such technology is able to find unused spectrum, configure
itself to use it, and be able to operate based on simple commands.
Moreover, this radio, as depicted in Figure 2 below, would provide an
ability for public safety agencies to interoperate at the physical layer (as
opposed to through IP-based communications). In a sense, this ability to
provide interoperability would reinforce and provide additional assurance
to the interoperability that could exist through IP-based communications.
41
Incmtible
Secure robust
N, tteroperability
L I Radio Platfrmi
Figure 2 42
D. Broadband
Even among traditional public safety radio administrators, there is an
increasing recognition that public safety agencies need to adopt broadband
technology to enable a series of mission-critical applications (such as
relaying pictures or video to and from the field). Indeed, a recent survey of
U.S. and Canadian consumers concluded that broadband is "the
40. This research project is now being conducted at Virginia Tech. See http://www.irea
n.vt.edu/researchworkshopapril2006/RondeauThomas.pdf.
41. In fact, the architecture of a cognitive radio-based solution is quite similar to that of
an IP-based solution in that a cognitive radio solution "can interconnect mutually
incompatible networks [by] allowing full interoperability through a system of systems
approach." Thomas W. Rondeau et al., Cognitive Radios in Public Safety and Spectrum
Management, Telecomm. Pol'y Research Conf. (2005), at 13, http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/
papers/2005/430/Rondeau- CognitiveRadios in PublicSafetyandSpectrumManageme
nt.pdf.
42. REED & BOSTIAN, UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES IN SOFTWARE DEFINED COGNITIVE
RADIO 10, http://www.mprg.org/publications/presentations/CognitiveRadiolssues.pdf.
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communication service they can least live without. '43 Nonetheless, which
broadband technology should be adopted and which model of financing
should be selected to facilitate the buildout of a broadband system remain
pressing and unanswered questions. While I do not have a particular
proposal in mind, I do believe that it is critical that policymakers embrace
the overall goal and develop an effective strategy for reaching it.
There are a number of strategies now being debated for spurring the
buildout of broadband technology to serve public safety agencies. Notably,
both Cyren Call and Frontline Wireless have offered to build broadband
networks for use by public safety agencies-in return for free spectrum or
specific restrictions on spectrum set to be auctioned.44 Similarly, there are
efforts underway to reallocate how the spectrum in the 700 MHz band-
which is slotted for public safety-is going to be organized so as to
facilitate the development of broadband access networks. 45 Finally, there
are a number of proposals that would enable public safety agencies to share
spectrum with commercial providers so that both public safety agencies
and commercial providers could have access to more spectrum on an as
needed basis.
46
Broadband access solutions can also be-and are being--developed
via dedicated high-speed wide area broadband technologies (e.g., EV-DO)
as well as using a Wi-Fi or WiMAX-based solution. For state and local
governments, the FCC has sought to encourage such efforts by making
available spectrum at 4.9 GHz so that localities can use Wi-Fi and WiMAX
technology for their public safety needs. 47 Today, for example, Tropos is
using Wi-Fi equipment, and Alvarion has developed WiMAX equipment
that can provide speeds sufficient to deliver pictures and video to police
officers in the field.4 8 Significantly, an Internet-based architecture is
43. North American Homes Rate Broadband as Key Wireless Service, IQ ONLINE, Oct.
27, 2006, http://www.arm.com/iqonline/news/marketnews/15168.html.
44. Marguerite Reardon, Public Safety Bids Spur Spectrum Spat, CNET NEWS.COM,
Mar. 2, 2007, http://news.com.com/Public+safety+bids+stir+spectrum+spat/2100-1033_3-
6163654.html?tag-st.prev.
45. See Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network
in the 700 MHz Band, Ninth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 06-181 (Dec. 20, 2006),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-181 A 1.pdf.
46. For one such proposal, see Joshua Marsh, Secondary Markets in Non-Federal
Public Safety Spectrum, Telecomm. Pol'y Research Conf. (2004), http://web.si.umich.edu/tp
rc/papers/2004/384/tprc.pdf.
47. See News Release, FCC Improves Public Safety Access To The Latest Broadband
Technology (Nov. 9, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
254117Al.doc (explaining that "public safety licensees [can now] use a single, low-cost
device to access the 4.9 GHz band, the U-NII band, and the ITS band, allowing them to
enjoy savings that are typically limited to the high-volume commercial market").
48. See TROPOs NETWORKS, METRO-SCALE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: HIGH-PROFILE
CRIMINAL TRIAL (Aug. 2004), http://www.tropos.com/pdf/peterson casestudy.pdf
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inherently modular and flexible, allowing different agencies to all
interoperate while experimenting with different broadband access
solutions.
Finally, a promising option for deploying broadband infrastructure is
the use of mesh networking systems. Such systems can be called
"infrastructureless" because they use distributed antennas-including ones
on the relevant devices themselves-to transmit broadband
communications. Indeed, mesh networking systems may well benefit from
the broader introduction and use of smart radio technology.
49
E. Information Accessible Through Rights Management
For most corporations using an enterprise architecture built around
Internet technology, the key components of their network are: (1) local
broadband access links; (2) an IP backbone network; and (3) "core
application services" accessible to all authorized users. As noted above,
this architecture does not necessarily require any reliance on the public
Internet at all. Rather, by using Internet technology (or "Intranets," as they
are sometimes called), corporations can connect their branch offices,
partners, and customers. Any such network, however, would not make
available all services to everyone with access to the network; supply chain
partners, for example, would not have access to customer service records.
To regulate who has access to what information, businesses use "rights
management" technology to limit who can use particular services. In the
context of public safety, for example, police officers would have access to
a gang database, but fire fighters would not need such access.
The use of a rights management model for access to core applications
is a classic feature of many Internet-enabled technologies. Notably, this
platform is fundamentally different from (and superior to) today's
specialized systems that provide little opportunity for customization,
(discussing Tropos' mesh networking wi-fi solution); IBM, Alvarion to Deliver Wireless
and WiMAXfor Public Safety, WIRELESS WEEK, May 11, 2006, http://www.wirelessweek.
com/article/CA6333878.html?text=wimax (discussing Alvarion's solution using WiMAX).
49. As a review of the technological landscape explained:
Since the cognitive radio technology enables the access to larger amount of
spectrum, [cognitive radio] networks can be used for mesh networks that will be
deployed in dense urban areas with the possibility of significant contention. For
example, the coverage area of [cognitive radio] networks can be increased when a
meshed wireless backbone network of infrastructure links is established based on
cognitive access points (CAPs) and fixed cognitive relay nodes (CRNs). The
capacity of a CAP, connected via a wired broadband access to the Internet, is
distributed into a large area with the help of a fixed CRN. [Cognitive radio]
networks have the ability to add temporary or permanent spectrum to the
infrastructure links used for relaying in case of high traffic load.
Akyildiz, supra note 34, at 2135 (footnotes omitted).
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evolution, or innovation. By so doing, it enables agencies to authenticate
who is a permitted user and restrict their access to information-regardless
of what underlying network they are using. Significantly, this model would
allow considerable customization so that while the fire department might
choose to share information with the local electric utility in one
jurisdiction, it need not do so in another jurisdiction.
I recognize that rights management technology, as currently being
used by commercial firms, is unlikely to meet all of the needs of public
safety agencies. Consequently, once public safety agencies commit to use
this architecture, there will be a need to drive the development of new
standards to facilitate applications to meet their particular needs. Indeed,
some efforts along these lines are already underway and, with an increased
commitment to their use, others will progress much more effectively. 50 To
be sure, the Department of Homeland Security's SAFECOM is
encouraging such efforts by developing its Statement of Requirements,
51
but SAFECOM has tended to adopt a narrower conception of
interoperability (as focused on the use of radios by traditional first
responders).
To appreciate the opportunities for shared applications regulated by
rights management technology, consider some of the initiatives underway
in Maryland. At present, Maryland is prioritizing the development of
technologies to enable electronic fingerprinting and biometric
identification. This system, at least as envisioned, would enable state police
officers to make criminal record checks from mobile data terminals in their
cruisers as well as to transmit this information on an as needed basis. 52 If
implemented on a shared network managed by rights management,
however, this information could also easily be made available---on an as
needed basis-to other agencies (say, local police).
50. One such effort underway involves a coalition of first responders working to
develop an Extensible Markup Language ("XML")-based standard (i.e., the Emergency
Data Exchange Language ("EDXL")). This system will enable a panoply of different
agencies that might be called to the scene of an accident (i.e., public safety, transportation,
and medical personnel) to share information with one another. Diane Frank, First
Responders Seek Common Lingo, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK, Nov. 15, 2004, http://www.fc
w.com/article84556.
51. See K.C. Jones, Emergency Responders Can't Communicate, DHS Warns, TECH
WEB, May 11, 2006, http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/187202152 (noting that
Department of Homeland Security "will set functional requirements and performance
standards"). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Homeland Security
First to Define Interoperability Requirements for Nation's First Responder Community
(Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0396.shtm.
52. Alice Lipowicz, Buying Power, WASH. TECH., Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.washingto
ntechnology.com/news/21_20/statelocal/29516-1.html.
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The architecture described above-which is flexible, extensible, and
based on IP technology-provides a far more effective means of ensuring
both operability and interoperability than by simply providing more
spectrum and more funds for traditional equipment. All too often,
policymakers are addressing interoperability issues by looking in the rear
view mirror, ignoring new technological opportunities, and failing to
realize the underlying causes of interoperability. As Jon Peha has
explained, "[o]ne cannot easily 'fix' interoperability as an afterthought to
today's infrastructure, any more than one can easily 'fix' fuel efficiency on
a racecar that was designed exclusively for maximum speed."
53
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part IV, developing and implementing
appropriate technologies are only part of the solution, as the thousands of
different agencies with jurisdiction to adopt unique information and
communications technologies greatly complicates any efforts to improve
interoperability.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR LEADERSHIP
Under the United States' governmental system, local agencies are
both empowered-and indeed expected-to make individualized decisions
about their information and communications technology needs. From the
perspective of viewing public safety communications as an enterprise, the
current model resembles a corporation where the marketing department
adopts one email system while its legal department adopts another one,
thereby complicating communications between the two and creating
unnecessary inefficiencies.
To date, federal policy has yet to view public safety communications
as an integrated system. Rather, policymakers have traditionally provided
grants of money and spectrum to local agencies to use as the4y see fit-as
opposed to using federal oversight to facilitate cooperation. On account
of the limited (if any) cooperation between different agencies, it should not
be a surprise that the system of public safety communications
infrastructure-designed by many thousands of independent decision
makers-would produce "a tangle of systems that do not interoperate."5
In general, the current model in place for facilitating interoperability
can be summed up with the mantra "more spectrum and more money" for
local agencies. Indeed, the "Deficit Reduction Act of 2005," which is
sometimes called the "plan of record" on public safety interoperability,
53. Jon M. Peha, How America's Fragmented Approach to Public Safety Wastes Money
and Spectrum, Telecomm. Pol'y Res. Conf. (2005), at 15, http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/paper
s/2005/438/PehaPublicSafetyCommunicationsTPRC_2005.pdf.
54. See Peha, supra note 4, at 5.
55. Peha, supra note 8.
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pursues just this strategy, providing more money ($1 billion for
interoperability grants) and more spectrum (24 MHz of spectrum cleared as
a result of the DTV transition) without addressing the more fundamental
flaws of public safety communications. This strategy, however, will almost
certainly ensure that we remain on the current path whereby public safety
agencies are investing enormous sums of money into a technologically
antiquated model. Fortunately, policymakers are increasingly appreciating
the flaws of this model, recognizing that funding public safety agencies to
the tune of $3 billion per year without developing a next generation
technological architecture will leave public safety without the opportunities
created by the Internet revolution.
56
Equally important as developing an appropriate technological
architecture is developing a framework for intergovernmental relations to
spur coordination between a myriad of different agencies. To be sure, the
use of IP networking provides a more flexible network architecture than the
model used by current public safety radios. But that flexibility only allows
firms to interoperate; it still takes leadership to encourage and facilitate
interoperability. Indeed, without the proper leadership and incentives, local
public safety agencies accustomed to making their own decisions are
unlikely to cooperate and seek to interoperate with one another.
57
The Alaska Land Mobile Radio system discussed above provides a
vivid illustration of how cooperation and clear leadership about technology
decisions can make an enormous difference. 5 8 Even though that system
relies on digital trunking (and not the set of technologies championed
above), the same success in facilitating coordination using that technology
can be used to facilitate interoperability using new technologies. In that
case, the major impetus for the project was federal money that was pegged
to a coordinated system and leadership that believed in the project. Such
pressures, as the ALMR case demonstrates, are necessary because people
do lose some control when they cooperate and, other things being equal,
will resist giving up that control without a fight.59 Consequently, to drive
56. Lipowicz, supra note 52.
57. As numerous experts have related, "all the technology and money in the world will
do little for interoperable communications unless the emergency responders are convinced
that they should communicate with each other." Jackson, supra note 10.
58. In another promising effort, the Wireless Accelerated Responder Network
("WARN") project envisions allowing broadband access to a number of agencies and
permitting interoperable, city-wide, real-time video tools for remote surveillance and
detection. US. Department of Commerce before the Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Cong. (2006)
(testimony of John M.R. Kneuer, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Commc'ns and Info. Admin.),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/congress/2006/Kneuer-interoperable_04250
6.htm.
59. As one observer stated with regard to new systems, "[p]eople are going to ask, 'Am
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technology adoption, the federal government should use its control of
money and spectrum more strategically, and states should be required to
assume greater leadership in developing interoperability plans that will
coordinate the information and communications technology needs of all
relevant agencies.
A. The Federal Government
Traditionally, the federal government has viewed itself largely as an
enabler of progress to be made at the local level. Consequently, the federal
government has traditionally divided spectrum licenses into locality and
agency-specific licenses and issued grants to the relevant agencies-as
opposed to being managed or restricted by a statewide (or region-wide)
program. In the case of spectrum, the decision to grant local licenses is
particularly unfortunate in that it is coupled with a policy of forbidding the
leasing of this spectrum, thereby creating the illusion that spectrum is free
and reinforcing the notion that local public safety agencies should operate
their own wireless networks. On account of such policies, as the House of
Representatives Committee Investigating the Katrina Disaster concluded,
"[s]tate and local governments [continue to be] responsible for designing
and coordinating their efforts, and [have] failed to make meaningful
progress despite knowledge of the problem for years and the expenditure of
millions in federal funds."6 0
It is critical that the federal government recognize the need for strong
incentives to encourage the embrace of a broader architecture that
facilitates interoperability. As noted above, there is an understandable
caution about relinquishing control and trying new technological
approaches. But more than just this caution, there is a serious principal-
agent problem that limits the attractiveness of the architecture described in
Part III (or any architecture that would displace the traditional prerogatives
of local agencies). In particular, the adoption of new technologies (such as
those discussed in Part III) may clash with the self-interest of a local
official who operates a public safety network and wants to continue doing
what she knows well.
The federal government is well positioned to address the conflict of
interest problems by dispelling the plausible reasons for sticking to the old
technology and by providing incentives for states to forge a new path
I going to lose any power or control?' Everyone has a little less control but, overall, they
have better capability. Once you get past the egos, it all makes sense." Jackson, supra note
10.
60. A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Comm. to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 000-000
at 174 (2006), available at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/katrinareport.pdf (emphasis added).
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ahead. In terms of the objections to shared networks, a regular refrain of
local public safety officials is that such networks (say, those using IP
technology) often fall short on the reliability and security fronts. This
objection, however, fails to appreciate that large numbers of critical
mission networks rely on commercial off-the-shelf equipment and
commercial networks that use Internet technology. Moreover, the
flexibility of such networks, particularly when part of an extensible
architecture that includes legacy equipment, promises levels of redundancy
that far exceed the capability of current networks.
A recent Aspen Institute report highlighted that policymakers
championing a next generation technology for public safety must overcome
a "culture of resistance." In particular, the conference report (quoting
Charlottesville Fire Department Chief Charles Weiner), explained:
the history of fiefdoms within the respective agencies obscures the
"gains from cooperation." In many cases, managers of legacy radio
systems tell chiefs that "you need to stick with the traditional land
mobile radio system" or the system won't remain secure. To be sure,
education and demonstration projects are part of the answer because
there is a basic lack of understanding about how modem networks are
designed and managed-for example, security stems from effective
encryption, not physically separate networks. Yet education alone will
not do the trick. As Chief Werner recounted from his experience,
getting beyond the silo-based approach is starting to happen where
incentives for cooperation-in the form of federal grants--create
opportunities to bring together groups of dist ct agencies and
individuals through consensus-building leadership.
Moreover, this report also emphasized that the failings in cooperation are
not limited to public safety communications, but also cover related failings
in government usage of technology (such as E-911 systems). 62
The federal government's reorientation of its model for issuing
interoperability grants and licenses for spectrum would be a crucial step in
creating powerful incentives for agencies to adopt new technologies and
facilitate interoperability. This change should be accompanied by the
federal government's leadership in developing the technologies noted
above and promoting state leadership and coordination to spur that
transition, including the use of accountability metrics that ensure federal
funds are spent effectively. Moreover, during the early stages of promoting
61. See Philip J. Weiser, Clearing the Air: Convergence and the Safety Enterprise 24-
25 (The Aspen Institute 2006) available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F
227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/C&S%20FINALAIRSREP06.PDF.
62. See id. at 25. See also DALE HATFIELD, A REPORT ON TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL
ISSUES IMPACTING THE PROVISION OF ENHANCED 911 (2002), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocument-
6513296239.
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the new technologies, the federal government can play a critical role in
supporting demonstration projects and publicity for best practices to
encourage states to begin to embrace the opportunities available in public
safety communications.
In terms of the federal government's leadership in developing new
technologies, there is an increasing awareness that the federal government
must assume a leadership role in spurring interoperability. For starters,
there is an increased recognition that certain standards development activity
should be supported at the federal level.63 Similarly, there is a growing
awareness of the value of investigating the potential of emerging
technologies. 64 Indeed, the National Institute of Justice is already pursuing
this course, as it "has made significant investments in new technologies
such as SDR, cognitive radio, and satellite communications for rural
agencies.
' 65
To ensure that the federal government's technological leadership role
is most effective, it should be guided by a basic reference model-based on
the technologies discussed in Part III-that will guide the public safety
communications systems of the future. 66 Such a model would outline the
basic technological architecture (and set of technologies) that public safety
agencies would use to communicate and manage their information needs.
This system, moreover, would leave some discretion to state and local
authorities, but would insist on certain requirements and components that
are necessary to enable effective public safety communications. The model
would, for example, emphasize that a broadband access link is critical, but
it would not necessarily dictate what type of technology or strategy would
be used to provide this link.
With a reference model in mind, the federal government should
develop a hierarchy of critical steps for individual state-led systems to
embrace. This hierarchy would take the form of a set of envisioned
outcomes and specific metrics that would be used to measure progress. The
federal government is well positioned to bring together the affected
stakeholders to identify the currently available technologies and best
63. The National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act of 2006, for
example, would require that the Department of Homeland Security develop the necessary
voluntary consensus standards in three years to facilitate a migration to a next generation
architecture. Moreover, the bill would also call for enhanced state leadership-in the form
of interoperability plans. See H.R. 5351, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
64. Peha, supra note 4, at 15.
65. The State of Interoperability: Perspectives on Federal Coordination of Grants,
Standards, and Technology Before the Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 3 (2006)
(statement of John S. Morgan, Assistant Dir. for Sci. and Tech., Dep't of Justice), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocom/testimonies/morgantest_060425.pdf.
66. See Weiser, supra note 61.
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practices that could inform such an action plan. Again, this action plan
would not require an abandonment of legacy systems or a one-size-fits-all
solution, but it would require the migration toward an overall flexible and
extensible architecture that leverages technologies currently being used by
commercial firms.
To do its part, the Federal Communications Commission
("Commission") should gear its spectrum policy decisions to spur the
adoption of the architecture outlined above. First, the Commission should
ensure that any decision to award spectrum licenses to local agencies is
conditioned on participation in a state or regional plan to migrate to a next
generation architecture. Such a step would dovetail nicely with the
Commission's current practice of requiring the local public safety agencies
to operate under the oversight of regional frequency coordinators, which
seek to limit interference and facilitate cooperation. Second, the
Commission should investigate possible strategies for facilitating the
development of a next generation broadband interoperable architecture.
Third, the Commission should investigate strategies for better organizing
the planned assignment of additional safety spectrum in the upper 700 MHz
band to enable broadband networking, either on spectrum dedicated to
public safety alone or in a manner that would integrate with commercially
available spectrum. Finally, the Commission should consider allowing
secondary markets for public safety users, thereby allowing users to both
access and lease spectrum pursuant to secondary market rules.
6 7
B. Empowering State Leadership
68
The federal government should no longer provide funds directly to
local agencies. Such a strategy only invites and facilitates the lack of
cooperation that has plagued public safety communications to date. Rather,
the federal government should work directly with state governments to spur
them to take a leadership role in ensuring greater levels of operability and
interoperability among public safety communications systems. 69 Over time,
67. In particular, allowing public safety spectrum to be leased-say, on an interruptible
basis-may raise additional revenue, create robust networks with enhanced functionality,
and reveal the opportunity costs of leaving this spectrum inefficiently used. See Marsh,
supra note 46.
68. This section largely reflects the discussion contained in the Aspen Report. See
Weiser, supra note 61.
69. To be sure, some state governments are already moving in this direction (with
support from the National Governors Association Policy Academy on Wireless
Interoperability), but federal encouragement is critical to ensuring more consistent and
effective leadership. See NASCIO, WE NEED TO TALK: GOVERNANCE MODEL TO ADVANCE
COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 2-3 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.nascio.org/
publications/documents/NASCIO-InteropGovResearchBrief.pdf.
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the money and spectrum provided to states should be conditioned on the
development of a coordinated strategy and the effective management
necessary to make it happen. By so doing, the federal government can
create powerful incentives for states to empower an official-say, a state
chief information officer ("CIO")-to facilitate cooperation and the
development of an integrated strategy.
The federal government should publicize its findings as to state
progress and ensure that states are held accountable by the court of public
opinion. Over time, once some states begin to lead the way in migrating
toward a new technological architecture, the federal government can act as
a referee of yardstick competition between states and enable transparent
assessments of how different states are progressing toward a next
generation architecture. Thus, for example, when forty states have adopted
IP backbone networks that connect all public safety agencies, E-911 calls,
and others working in conjunction with first responders (say, ambulance
dispatch services), it will put considerable pressure on the ten remaining
states that have yet to do so. Moreover, the federal government should
perform regular audits to evaluate which states are using communications
and information technology effectively.
The critical role for state governments is to develop the skills
necessary to oversee an integrated emergency communications strategy.
Ideally, this strategy would take a broad view of emergency response,
including the current state of E-911 technology. In any event, it would
certainly commit to developing shared resources where appropriate and
would ensure that all federal and state funds were invested to advance the
migration to a next generation architecture.
Leadership at the state level can make an enormous difference in
driving adoption of advanced technologies that will provide for greater
functionality and affordable systems. To spur such effective leadership,
each state should appoint a single official (say, the state CIO or an
emergency management head) to oversee the development of a statewide
plan to migrate toward a next generation architecture. Based on the efforts
of some states to better leverage the use of information and
communications technology through an empowered and centralized CIO
(where all IT employees worked for a single agency), there are strong
reasons to believe that such a model can succeed in this area.70
The challenge for ensuring effective emergency communications is
that public safety agencies should act more like enterprise customers,
requiring certain functionalities and not specifying particular technologies
70. See, e.g., Tod Newcombe, Leaving His Mark, PUBLIC CIO, Nov. 8, 2005, available
at http://www.public-cio.com/story.php?id=2005.11.08-97208.
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that they must control and maintain. State or federal agencies can move to
this model by developing Request for Proposals ("RFPs") and requirements
documents that can be used by local agencies to procure the needed
services and to take advantage of shared investments in information and
communications technology. Increasingly, most local public safety
agencies are ill-prepared to judge the potential of modem technology-let
alone to integrate it in an effective fashion. Thus, even as to the deployment
of broadband access networks (an inherently local task), most local
agencies will be best served by following the strategies used by larger and
more sophisticated entities (say, New York City) to the extent that their
strategy for building out broadband networks can work for them.
7 1
V. CONCLUSION
The current strategy for addressing the failings of public safety
communications is essentially to make incremental progress through the
implementation of digital trunking arrangements. To be sure, this step
constitutes important progress and, as demonstrated in the ALMR case, can
lead to important improvements. It represents, however, only a piecemeal
solution to a problem that rests on the flawed foundations of a system of
public safety communications that resists changes and implements
solutions in a localized manner. The ultimate solution is to break away
from the prevailing culture around public safety communications both with
respect to its aversion to new technologies and to its resistance to oversight
and accountability.
A number of emerging technologies promise to transform public
safety communications into a system that is far more flexible and
extensible than the current model. Unfortunately, over the last ten years,
localities have spent tens of billions of dollars upgrading their
communications capabilities by buying replacement equipment that, like its
predecessors, was specialized and thus technologically limited. Over the
next ten years, multimode radios, IP-based technology, broadband
communications, cognitive radio systems, and rights management
technologies all promise to transform public safety communications and to
set it on a new path of technological development. In so doing, these
technologies-which can be implemented alongside legacy systems-will
afford agencies interoperable, secure, reliable, redundant, and high-
performance communications systems.
71. Just recently, New York City announced its plan for a $500 million wireless
broadband network that would facilitate the sharing of antiterrorism databases, fingerprints,
mug shots, maps, and video. See Claudia Parsons, NYC Orders $500 Million Emergency
Data Network, PERI, Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://www.riskinstitute.org/PERI/NEWS
/NYC+Orders+500+Million+Emergency+Data+Network.htm.
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The United States' commitment to localism and resistance to
centralized authority is often a virtue. In the case of public safety
communications, however, the lack of centralized oversight and
coordination-at least on a state level-is highly problematic. Left to their
own devices, local public safety agencies often live comfortably in an
isolated and antiquated technological environment. Consequently, the
federal government must spearhead an initiative where-backed by state
oversight and responsibility-local agencies migrate to a new technological
architecture and federal incentives (both grants and spectrum) spur them to
do so. Ultimately, the power of this new architecture promises a far more
functional and efficient public safety system. But many of the operators of
the current system will not abandon the current model unless pushed to do
so, and thus it is critical that the federal and state governments not engage
in bottom-up leadership, but rather consult with local agencies as to their
particular needs and incentivize them to adopt new technologies that will
meet them.
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